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Terrorism Review

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13 October 1983

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GI TR 83-021
13 October 1983

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**Terrorism
Review**

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13 October 1983

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*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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**Terrorism
Review**

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13 October 1983

Perspective***International Terrorist Activity: A Snapshot View***

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International terrorism continued to command center stage through the first nine months of 1983:

- In April, terrorists bombed the US Embassy in Beirut, killing more than 60 people—including 17 Americans. The exact identities of the perpetrators are still unknown.
- The African National Congress, a liberation organization whose previous attacks were generally designed to destroy property but to avoid casualties, detonated a car bomb outside the South African Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria in May, injuring 217 and killing 19.
- Armenian terrorists, whose blood feud with the Turks has crossed a new threshold of international violence, bombed the Turkish ticket counter at Paris's Orly Airport, killing six and injuring more than 60.

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- Most recently, an as yet unidentified group of terrorists—possibly acting at the instigation of North Korea—detonated a bomb in Rangoon, Burma, killing 16 senior South Korean officials. The apparent target of this blatant display of terrorist violence was South Korean President Chun, who escaped death by sheer chance.

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Spectaculars all, these incidents once again succeeded in drawing the attention—if not sympathy—of the world to their perpetrators' causes. Small wonder then that Americans continue to believe that terrorists run rampant and cannot be brought to heel, and that people and institutions everywhere remain highly vulnerable to their random and lethal threat.

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Terrorism Trends—The Last Nine Months

A close—though admittedly somewhat subjective—look at terrorist group activity as illustrated in the attached chart suggests otherwise. Although our files are still not complete for the year, the volume and impact of terrorist incidents, in fact, appear to be on the decline—quite likely in response to a series of government counterterrorist successes that occurred in Italy and West Germany in 1982.

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However heartening, the decline clearly is not applicable to all groups and is largely attributable to a variety of factors—notably, better tactics by European security agencies coupled with new antiterrorism legislation. Moreover, particularly in Latin America, a number of key terrorist groups are well on their way to graduating into insurgent movements. []

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Consequently, we see little cause for optimism that worldwide terrorist activity is permanently on the wane. Early data hint, for example, that even at the reduced level of activity, terrorist incidents are generating increased fatalities. Though the increased lethality may reflect some greater operational effectiveness, in many cases it also represents an outlet for extreme frustration or competition for the public spotlight among the groups. []

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Neither our data nor the accompanying chart provides the answers or enables us to draw broad generalizations or project future trends. It does at least permit us to track—however broadly—developing trends in terror. Although it is no more than a preliminary snapshot of terrorist activity, it can be compared and contrasted with other such snapshots in the future as well as those of the past. []

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Regional Wrap-up

Europe. In West Germany, after a period of reduced terrorist activity resulting from an effective government campaign, there is some evidence of a step-up in violence, probably largely linked to the upcoming INF deployment. The terrorist Revolutionary Cells recently demonstrated their capabilities to exploit the INF issue by destroying the computer of a well-known German firm they claimed was manufacturing components for Pershing missile transport trucks. Moreover, the coming months could prove critical in determining whether West Germany's most notorious terrorist organization, the Red Army Faction, has been able to successfully regenerate its leadership core. []

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In Italy, where the government is given credit by many for breaking the back of the infamous Red Brigades, terrorist activity has remained in an apparent state of dormancy thus far this year. The period of inactivity could also be one of rebuilding, however, and many analysts doubt that Italian counterterrorist successes have caused the permanent demise of the Red Brigades, let alone of the socioeconomic grievances that have helped sustain their support. []

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Middle East. In some parts of the Middle East, the high level of conventional military activity has subsumed and almost obscured terrorism. Various radical Palestinian groups—major initiators of international terrorism well beyond the borders of the Middle East—have been relatively quiet in recent months. The lull probably reflects the ongoing battle for dominance within the PLO between Arafat's "moderate" Fatah loyalists and the more radical Syrian-influenced groups. An upsurge in Palestinian terrorism could be in the offing, however, particularly if the radicals gain the upper hand and remove the Arafat-imposed restraints on terrorism. State-sponsored or state-supported terrorism—most importantly on the part of Iran and Syria—continues apace as both countries use terror as another tool to advance their national interests. []

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Armenians. The Armenians, whose cause does not honor political borders, have become increasingly active in recent months. Splits within the already polarized Armenian terrorist movement may be a major impetus behind increased violence. There is little prospect that either the rightwing JCAG or the leftwing ASALA—the two principal Armenian groups—will soon eschew violence. [REDACTED]

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Latin America. Terrorism in Colombia, an outgrowth of a multigroup insurgency that has plagued the nation for decades, remains a persistent but not currently explosive problem. In Peru, the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) became increasingly active last year, has remained so in 1983, and there is no evidence that their terrorist activity will soon abate. [REDACTED]

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In Central America, both rightwing and leftwing terrorist activity has continued, with no great upsurge or diminution, against a backdrop of social, economic, and political turmoil. Here the influence of Soviet and Cuban support for leftist forces, who conduct terrorist operations as part of their insurgent campaign, and the impact of an enhanced US presence remain “wild cards” whose effects have yet to be fully played out. [REDACTED]

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Activity and Impact of Prominent Terrorist Groups, 1983

		January to March	April to June	July to September	October to December			January to March	April to June	July to September	October to December
Legend											
Level of operational activity											
● Heavy											
● Moderate											
● Light											
Impact on target											
● Severe											
● Moderate											
● Negligible											
Absence of symbol indicates no information/no impact.											
Transnational											
Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)		● ●	● ●	● ●				● ●	● ●	● ●	
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)		● ●	●	● ●							
Croatian Terrorists											
Black June Organization (BJO) (Palestinian)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
15th of May Organization (Palestinian)											
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC)											
Fatah		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Saiga (Palestinian)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Japanese Red Army (JRA)											
Carlos Apparatus		● ●	● ●								
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)											
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon From Foreigners		● ●	● ●								
Europe											
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) (UK)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (UK)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
ETA and GRAPO (Spain)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
FP-25 (Portugal)											
Action Directe (France)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Red Brigades (BR) (Italy)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Red Army Faction (RAF) (West Germany)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
Asia/Africa											
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) (West Germany)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Revolutionary Peoples Struggle (ELA) (Greece)											
Dev Sol. Dev Yol. MLAPU, THKP/C, TPLF/P, TIKB (Turkey)											
Latin America											
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) (Guatemala)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) (Guatemala)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) (Guatemala)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Peoples Revolutionary Union/Popular Liberation Movement (CINCHONERO) (Honduras)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Popular Revolutionary Forces (Lorenzo Zelaya) (Honduras)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
19th of April Movement (M-19) (Colombia)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Colombia)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Red Flag (Venezuela)											
Sendero Luminoso (SL) (Peru)								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Montenoneros (Argentina)											
MIR (Chile)		● ●	● ●	● ●							
State Groups											
Syrian intelligence services/defense companies								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Iranian intelligence services								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Libyan intelligence services								● ●	● ●	● ●	
Iraqi intelligence services											

Note: This chart is the first in a quarterly series. The judgments—while not reflective of specific quantitative criteria—were made by regional and/or terrorist group analysts in coordination with computer systems analysis. CIA intends that in the future the chart will reflect more explicit quantitative standards for assigning the heavy/severe, moderate, and light/negligible designations to the groups.

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
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Highlights**Alert List*****West Germany: Violence Likely at Nordenham/Bremerhaven Demonstrations.***

According to West German security officials, the potential for violence during the 13-15 October demonstrations in northern Germany has increased. They base their assessment on the numbers of radicals involved in recent planning sessions and on [] conversations between imprisoned terrorists and their visitors. Blockades are planned for the Carl Schurz military barracks in Bremerhaven and the Midgard shipping firm in Nordenham. []

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Key Indicators

West Germany: Assessment of the Threat to Armaments Firms. West German officials cite the recent bombing of the MAN firm near Frankfurt as an indication that companies involved in the armaments industry increasingly are becoming a target of militant activity. These officials believe that terrorist groups are likely to use the anti-INF campaign to justify continued attacks this fall. []

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Significant Developments

International: New Armenian Underground Group. The newly formed Armenian underground group—the Organization for the Reunification and Independence of Armenia (ORIA)—has disassociated itself from the terrorist group Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The ORIA—in communiques submitted to Armenian newspapers—condemned the indiscriminate, anti-French violence of ASALA and appeared to be aligning itself with the ASALA Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM) based in the Middle East. ASALA-RM also is a splinter group that broke from ASALA in August 1983 over the issue of indiscriminately using violence against non-Turkish targets. Because ORIA appears to be based in France, it is possible that it is a support apparatus for ASALA-RM. []

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Corsica: New Separatist Group Formed. A new separatist group—the Corsican Movement for Self-Determination (CMSD)—has emerged following the French Government's banning of the Council of Nationalist Committees (CCN) on 27 September. The CCN apparently served as the overt political wing of the also-banned Corsican separatist group National Front for the Liberation of Corsica, and was considered a “legal refuge” for separatist terrorists. Paris' banning of the CCN appears to be in retaliation for the murder of a senior civil servant and continuing bombings claimed by the FLNC. We expect the CMSD will supplant the CCN as the focal point for Corsican independence efforts while the clandestine FLNC will continue to conduct attacks against French targets. []

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Italy: Protest Actions Delay Construction Work at Cruise Missile Site. Protesters accomplished their avowed goal of stopping construction work at Comiso Air Base during two days of anti-INF demonstrations. Violent confrontations between police and demonstrators occurred the first day when police cleared the access road to allow US airmen onto the base. US Consulate officials in Palermo have noted that the protesters focused on the arriving US personnel, a tactic not seen in previous demonstrations. []

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France: Reorganization of Counterterrorist Unit. The elite French strike force, the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), is to be reorganized and expanded. The GIGN—which has also been responsible for presidential protection—has been sharply criticized in recent months because its failure to observe proper police procedures in a case involving three Irish terrorists resulted in their release. Moreover, alleged breaches in security for President Mitterrand, turf clashes with other services, and a high public profile further interfered with the GIGN's effectiveness. The GIGN will have its staff increased from 73 to 211, divided into an 85-member Special Intervention Group and a 125-member Paratrooper Squadron. The new chief of the force—Gendarmerie Captain Masselin—is said to be more sensitive than his predecessor to the potential pitfalls of maintaining a high public profile. The GIGN's founder, Major Pronteau, who was dismissed as its chief earlier this year, will continue to advise President Mitterrand on terrorism and executive protection; the latter function apparently will be separated from the GIGN. []

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International: Terrorist Group Claims Gulf Air Crash. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility for the downing on 23 September of a Gulf Air plane near Abu Dhabi. In a telephone call on 3 October to *Agence France-Presse* in Paris, the caller said the group “exploded” a device on the plane in retaliation for the UAE's “fascistic measures,” which have adversely affected Arabs and Palestinians. According to the Bahraini press, a call was also received on 3 October in Vienna from the Abu Nidal group claiming responsibility because of the UAE's “expulsion of Palestinian workers.” The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB) have previously claimed credit for the 1982 assassinations of an Israeli diplomat in Paris and a Kuwaiti diplomat in New Delhi. French police have verified through ballistic examinations that the weapon used in the killing of the Israeli diplomat was identical to the one used in January 1982 to kill Lt. Col. Ray in Paris. []

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West Germany: Weapons Stolen from US Military Installation. A case of 30 handgrenades recently stolen from a US military training area may be linked to the anti-INF campaign. Following a similar incident in 1972, grenades stolen from a US military storage area turned up periodically in the hands of West German and international terrorists. [redacted]

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Bombing in Rangoon Decimates Top South Korean Leadership Ranks. Some 16 senior South Korean officials and four Burmese were killed by a powerful bomb that probably was intended for South Korean President Chun. Although circumstantial evidence points to North Korea as the force behind the terrorist attack, there is as yet no evidence to support South Korean claims that P'yongyang is to blame. It is also possible that Burmese insurgents or recently purged security officials intent on embarrassing the government could be responsible. [redacted]

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Argentina: The Politics of Counterterrorism

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The amnesty and antiterrorism laws just issued by Argentina's military government are viewed by many civilian leaders as self-serving and are, in our judgment, likely to be the focus of debate within the civilian congress when it convenes in 1984.

law because actions taken during the "dirty war" were in response to orders from superior officers, and they had believed this would be a justifiable defense of their actions.

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The new amnesty law (officially, the Law for National Pacification) is designed to protect the armed forces from punitive action by the civilian government following the upcoming October elections. It covers the period from the beginning of the last constitutional government in May 1973 to the installation of President Bignone in June 1982. The law specifically exempts from prosecution police and military personnel who participated in the violent campaign against leftists during the 1970s. Moreover, the decree is sweeping: it orders that all ongoing investigations into the hundreds of deaths and more than 6,000 political disappearances be immediately dropped if they involve members of the police or armed forces.

Promulgation of the amnesty was quickly followed by presidential signature of another law assigning special antiterrorist powers to the military. The government intends the antiterrorist law (officially, the Law for the Judgment of Subversive Acts) to streamline the judicial system and provide a legal apparatus for "preventing and punishing subversion and terrorism." It grants police broad powers to tap telephones, open mail, search houses, and make arrests without a warrant. The law also allows police to detain terrorist suspects incommunicado for up to 48 hours, if a judge is notified of the detention, and for up to 15 days with a judge's permission. Terrorist and subversive acts committed by civilians will no longer be subject to military law, but are to be decided by the Federal Court of Appeals, whose decisions cannot be appealed.

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In contrast, the law is much more exclusive in its treatment of subversives and benefits only those who have not yet been legally charged with antigovernmental activity. In addition, it leaves the door open for future legal action against some of the more notorious terrorist leaders by excluding from its amnesty provisions those subversives living abroad. The decree also exempts from amnesty those suspects who have shown their "intention to continue" their association with guerrilla or terrorist organizations and those already convicted of terrorism.

Public reaction to the amnesty and antiterrorism laws has been swift and harsh: leading civilian politicians, lawyers, and churchmen have denounced the laws as unconstitutional and reactionary and predict their repeal once a civilian congress convenes. Several trial judges have termed the amnesty law invalid, stating that, because the current government seized power in a coup, it does not have the constitutional authority to decree political laws such as the amnesty. Two judges have already refused to forward political disappearance cases to the Federal Appeals Court for possible dismissal as is required by the terms of the amnesty.

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Interservice disputes among the armed forces—over who should be covered, the date of issuance, and the period of time that should be covered by the amnesty—delayed the amnesty decree for months. Many officers opposed the amnesty on the grounds that it implicitly acknowledged that the military had committed crimes. Some junior officers also opposed the

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Repeal of the laws—a time-consuming and legally difficult process—seems unlikely, though some attempts at modification by the new congress can probably be expected. According to Embassy reporting, there appears to be a general consensus among political leaders that a strong legal apparatus is needed to deter terrorism. In addition, most politicians recognize that the new civilian government could be destabilized were it to attempt to prosecute military officials. Human rights activists, however, will continue to protest both the abridgment of civil liberties inherent in the antiterrorism law and the denial of military culpability in the amnesty law.

[REDACTED]

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In the final analysis, the future of the new amnesty/antiterrorism package will largely depend on the outcome of the October national elections. Although leaders of both major political parties have publicly predicted the repeal of the laws, the Radicals have been more strident than the Peronists in their condemnations. One of the first orders of business for the new civilian congress, therefore, is likely to be a debate on how best to modify the new antiterrorism program to finally close the “dirty war” chapter in Argentina’s history, while at the same time guaranteeing a modicum of civil liberties.

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The Psychology of Terrorist Behavior

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Attempts by behavioral scientists to delineate "the terrorist mind-set" have not succeeded. There are almost as many variants of personality among individuals who become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are among the general population. Nevertheless, because the terrorist group satisfies certain personality needs, certain personality types are disproportionately attracted to the path of terrorism.

Within the wide range of terrorist groups, we can distinguish between two basic types: anarchic groups such as West Germany's Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades of Italy, and nationalist/secessionist groups such as the Fatherland and Liberty Movement of the Basques and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. There would seem to be profound differences between terrorists bent on destroying their own society, the "world of their fathers," and those whose terrorist activities carry on the mission of their fathers. To put it another way, for some, becoming terrorists is an act of retaliation for real and imagined hurts *against the society of their parents*; for others, it is an act of retaliation against society for the hurt *done to their parents*.

This dichotomy implies that those committed to anarchy and the destruction of society suffer from more severe psychopathology, while those who join nationalist or secessionist movements to carry out their parents' mission are healthier in psychological terms. Moreover, the more repressive a society is, the more likely it is that the healthy will act in opposition to it. Yet, no matter how just the cause appears, no matter how repressive the society, there are some who join and some who don't. Not every son of a Basque joins ETA. Are those who join the true patriots, and those who don't cowards? Or are those who join more driven psychologically, while those who don't are psychologically healthier?

Although we do not have data for the full range of terrorist groups, several have been studied systematically and other studies are under way. The results suggest the outlines of a theory of the psychology of terrorist behavior.

Particularly thorough is a comprehensive study of terrorism in West Germany conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. The German scholars studied the life histories and careers of 227 leftwing terrorists of the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement. They found a pattern of incomplete family structure, especially during adolescence, with some 25 percent of the leftist terrorists having lost one or both parents by age 14—a much higher figure than among their nonterrorist peers. Incidence of loss of the father in adolescence was particularly pronounced. Moreover, fully a third reported conflicts with society that resulted in conviction in juvenile court. Researchers, who also observed a disproportionately high level of educational and work failure compared with society as a whole, described the terrorists as "advancement oriented and failure prone." The terrorist career appeared to be "the terminal point of a series of abortive adaptation attempts and unresolved political conflicts."

The terrorists had made a complete break with their previous social surroundings, values, and norms. Although they developed strong positive feelings for their group, they maintained an overriding hatred for the enveloping larger group—society. Because dependence on a group of contemporaries is characteristic of adolescence, researchers suggest that terrorists' need to sustain membership in such a group into their twenties represents prolonged and unresolved adolescent conflicts.

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Although the terrorists who were examined were not described as mentally ill, there was a high proportion of two personality types that are particularly attracted to terrorist groups. Many of the individuals were extremely self-centered, with little regard for the feelings of others. Such individuals use others and prefer a parasitic lifestyle. These individuals seek and enjoy stimulation and tend to become bored easily. They seek both action and recognition and are attracted to what they believe to be the exciting life of the revolutionary.

Individuals of the second personality type are extremely hostile and share many features of the paranoid personality. These individuals are suspicious and aggressive, sensitive to slight, and always ready to defend themselves. Their motivation for joining the terrorist group is that it provides a setting that justifies and provides sanction for projecting the person's own hostility upon society.

Material developed from in-depth interviews of a small group of imprisoned leftwing German terrorists suggests a link between certain personality attributes and group behavior. These individuals reached young adulthood with a deficient sense of self-esteem and flawed personalities of a particular type—the narcissistic personality disorder. To compensate for their underlying self-doubt, these individuals developed exaggerated—in some cases, grandiose—concepts of their elevated role in an ideal world. Loners, alienated individuals who did not fit, they projected onto society the blame for their own inadequacies when their exaggerated expectations were inevitably disappointed. For these alienated individuals who existed on the margins of society, joining a terrorist group represented the first real sense of belonging after a lifetime of rejection, and the terrorist group became the family they never had. Other studies, by Italian scholars who have analyzed the family backgrounds of members of the Italian Red Brigades and interviewed some imprisoned terrorists, came to similar conclusions.

What of the “nationalist-secessionist” terrorists? Analysis of the social background of Basque terrorists provides data that add to our understanding of terrorist psychology. The Basques are a fiercely proud,

intensely nationalistic people, and there is very little intermarriage between the Basques and the Spanish. Indeed, in the Basque area of Spain, only 8 percent of the families are of mixed Basque-Spanish heritage. Children of such families are shunned and subjected to ridicule, scorn, and social isolation. But fully 40 percent of the membership of ETA is drawn from such mixed-parent families. It is the outcasts, those on the margins of society, who exaggerate their political identity to achieve a psychosocial identity.

The decision to join ETA, however, does not represent a total commitment to a life of terrorism. ETA is supported by Basque society. The average tenure for ETA membership is only three years, and, in a sense, joining ETA is just one stage in psychological development. The youth moves into this group and then moves on into the mainstream of society. This is in sharp contrast to individuals who join the Red Brigades or the Red Army Faction. The German scholars call the decision to join the group and go underground to pursue illegal activity “Der Sprung” (The Leap) for it is a fundamental and irrevocable decision.

It is interesting to observe that for ETA, for the Red Brigades, and for the Red Army Faction—very different groups indeed—the path to joining is quite similar. It is gradual and progressive. The individual moves, or is moved, from sympathizer, to passive supporter, to active supporter, and finally, if he has demonstrated his dedication, his willingness to devote himself to the cause, he may be asked to join the group officially.

The need to belong—to effect a stable identity, to bridge the conflict between oneself and society—helps explain the similarities in behavior of terrorists in widely divergent groups.

For the individual who espouses the cause of the politicized ethnic or national minority—such as the Basque separatists—the *split* derives from the *split within society* and is a *split in the sense of political identity*. For the anarchic-terrorists, the *split is within the personality* of the individual and is caused by

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early developmental difficulties. Individuals with such personality disorders tend to be absolutists who see themselves as all good and society as all bad. Having identified the government as the source of problems, it follows that the way to cure the problems is to destroy the government. Alone, alienated, and on the margins of society, such individuals are relieved to find other like-minded individuals, to be accepted at last.

If this formulation is an accurate description of the psychology of at least some terrorists, it has profound implications for the meaning of joining a group, and for the impact of group dynamics on sustaining membership and on group decisionmaking. It suggests that to belong to a terrorist group serves goals beyond those espoused by the group. Besides seeking to rectify the grievances of the Armenians, to establish the Basque nation, recapture the Palestinian homeland, or to bring down the German or Italian Governments, the individual member seeks to *belong*. Sustaining the group and being accepted by it assumes major—indeed preeminent—importance. This explains the important role played by group dynamics in determining terrorist decisionmaking and behavior.

For those individuals with damaged self-esteem, there is a tendency to merge themselves in the group. In a figurative manner, we can consider the development of a group mind. Particularly among those psychologically scarred individuals who fail to develop individual consciences, the group becomes the determinant of ethical standards.

This concept is basic to understanding the degree of violence and cruelty to which terrorists can go. The group becomes idealized, and the standards of the group take over and become the norm. What the group says is the standard; what the group asks for is desirable. The standards of the world outside of the group have become alien. It is into this world that the hateful, aggressive impulses of the group's members have been projected, and it now is this world that they believe must be destroyed.

The importance of group membership and the power of the group mind are associated with strong pressures to conform and not to question. For individuals who

find the world uncertain and are plagued by inner doubts and questions, it is very attractive to find a group where certainty is the rule and doubt is unacceptable. Individuals who question the beliefs or actions of the group risk being considered disloyal and, in turn, being ousted from the group. There is data to suggest that the lonelier and more psychologically troubled an individual was prior to joining, the less likely he is to question the group's program, no matter how violent. He does not wish to jeopardize his membership in the group.

Observations concerning the group dynamics of the underground group based on experiences in the Polish underground during World War II have clear implications for terrorist group dynamics. In the underground group, inaction produces an almost unbearable tension, a tension that threatens the group's integrity. The group's actions may be determined much less by external political or military events than by the group's needs to act in order to reduce internal tension and to restore its sense of purpose. Group dynamics, therefore, is a principal determinant of group actions for such organizations. The perceptive leader will sense the group's need to act in order to discharge this tension. He directs the group to attack the enemy before it attacks him. A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence and in order to maintain its cohesion.

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
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Statistical Overview: International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83

■ Total, 891
 ■ Of which: US targets, 392



Category of
International
Terrorist Incidents,
1982-83, by
Month

	J 1982	F 1982	M 1982	A 1982	M 1982	J 1982	J 1982	A 1982	S 1982	O 1982	N 1982	D 1982	J 1983	F 1983	M 1983	A 1983	M 1983	J 1983	J 1983	A 1983	S 1983	O 1983	N 1983	D 1983	Total
Total	74	90	52	59	47	50	57	59	77	82	59	66	70	58	41										941
Kidnaping	4		1	4	3	2	2	4	4	3	3	2	3	5	1										41
Barricade, hostage	1	1	6	1	5	2	1	2	3	4	2	2	3	1	3										37
Bombing	42	32	13	17	18	23	22	25	27	30	22	32	22	22	12										359
Armed attack			2	1				2	2	4	1	2	3		2										19
Hijacking	3	4	1	3	3	1	4	6	3	4	7	6	10	3	2										60
Assassination	3	4	5		1	2	4	1	4	5	2	4	2	3	1										41
Threats, hoax	19	44	18	23	14	16	20	15	29	25	18	17	24	22	19										323
Sniping	1	2	3	2	1		1	2	1	2					1										16
Other ^b	1	3	3	8	2	4	3	2	4	5	4	1	3	1	1										45

^aFigures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

^bBreak-ins, conspiracies, shootouts, etc.

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Chronology

This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received. []

25X1

12 September 1983

Italy: Rightwing Terrorist Arrested

In Milan, carabinieri arrested a major terrorist and two other members of the Armed Revolutionary Cell (NAR). According to Italian security officials, these arrests should drastically curtail NAR terrorist activities. []

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13 September 1983

Spain: Rocket Attack at Madrid Airport

In Madrid, a rocket-propelled grenade exploded near the area used by various Arab airlines, but caused no damage. No group has claimed credit for the attack. []

25X1

17 September 1983

Venezuela: Colombian Guerrillas Attack Venezuelan Guard Post

Thirty members of the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), working with support from members of the Venezuelan Bandera Roja (BR) terrorist group, attacked a Venezuelan National Guard border post in Cutufi, killing one and injuring eight. The Domingo Lain Saez front of the ELN claimed credit for the incident. Colombian guerrillas have sought to maximize the extensive publicity generated by the incident by announcing the formation of an international guerrilla front. []

25X1

18 September 1983

France: Police Discover Explosives Cache

In L'Arbreda near the Spanish border, French police uncovered 90 kilograms of Goma 2 explosive—the “trademark” explosive used by the Spanish Basque group ETA—at a farm used by French Basque terrorists. Spanish police have determined that the explosives were stolen from a Spanish explosives firm. []

25X1

23 September 1983

Spain: Arrest of GRAPO Members

In Barcelona, Spanish National Police arrested two members of the leftwing terrorist group First of October Armed Revolutionary Group (GRAPO) and reportedly discovered three GRAPO safehouses containing arms and explosives. Although very few GRAPO members remain at large, police sources are reluctant to declare the group defunct, given the past regenerative surges of the group—especially its recent bank robbery attempt in La Coruna. We note that Spanish police are concerned about the release from prison of GRAPO members who have served sentences for terrorist-related crimes and who may now resume links with fugitive GRAPO terrorists. []

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13 October 1983

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Chile: Hotel Firebombed

The O'Higgins Hotel in Vina del Mar was firebombed, causing minor damages and injuring a passerby. No group has claimed credit for the incident. [REDACTED]

25X1

Bolivia: La Paz Newspaper Office Attacked

The offices of the daily newspaper, *Hoy*, and adjacent buildings were heavily damaged by a dynamite explosion. Although the offices were occupied, there were no injuries. An anonymous caller claimed the bombing was a warning against the newspaper's "collaboration" with Nationalist Revolutionary Party chief, Paz Estensoro. [REDACTED]

25X1

24 September 1983

Philippines: Grenades Thrown Into Crowd

Two fragmentation grenades were thrown into a crowd in Davao and, together with the resultant stampede, killed 15 and wounded at least 252. Police have blamed the yet-unclaimed attack on the Communist New People's Army. [REDACTED]

25X1

France: Bombing of Naval Ministry

In Paris, a bomb exploded during the night at the Naval Ministry, causing property damage but no injuries. No group has claimed credit for the attack. [REDACTED]

25X1

Corsica: Responsibility for Bombings

In Ajaccio, the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC)—in a communique to the French media—claimed responsibility for a wave of 44 explosions since 1 September. The bombings caused only property damage to official buildings on the French-governed island. The FLNC communique also expressed its support for jailed Corsican separatists who allegedly are mounting protest actions in prisons on the French mainland. [REDACTED]

25X1

Italy: Fugitive Radical MP Pledges To Return

In Rome, fugitive member of the Italian Parliament and alleged terrorist Toni Negri—whose thinking has had a major ideological influence on the Red Brigades—pledged to return to Italy to face terrorism charges. Negri was jailed for four years while awaiting trial but was released under legislative immunity when he was elected to Parliament on the small Radical Party ticket in June 1983. Negri vanished before the Italian Parliament authorized his re-arrest on 21 September, but, in a taped message broadcast on Radio Radicale, promised to return to face the charges and continue his party's fight against the Italian judicial system. [REDACTED]

25X1

25 September 1983

Honduras: Police Defuse Bomb

Local police defused a bomb hidden in a box in the garbage area of the Plaza Cristal commercial center in San Pedro Sula. No group has claimed responsibility for placing the bomb. [REDACTED]

25X1

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26 September 1983**France: The Return of Direct Action**

In Paris, the leftist terrorist group, Direct Action, has claimed credit for the bombing of the Naval Documentation Center as a protest against French military involvement in Chad and Lebanon. No one was injured in the nighttime attack, although there was minor property damage to the building. [REDACTED]

25X1

27 September 1983**Guatemala: Bombing in Guatemala City**

A powerful bomb exploded approximately 300 yards from the US Embassy in Guatemala City, causing no damage or injuries. As yet, no group has claimed responsibility for the blast, which, according to the police, was heard as far as 2 miles away. [REDACTED]

25X1

Spain: Bombing of Army Store

In San Sebastian, a bomb exploded outside a Spanish Army store, causing damage but no injuries. Although no group has yet claimed credit for the attack, we believe the military wing of the Basque separatist group, Fatherland and Liberty (ETA/M), in view of its past choice of targets, was probably responsible for the attack. [REDACTED]

25X1

28 September 1983**Spain: Bombing of Army Warehouse**

In San Sebastian, the Spanish military again was the target of bomb attacks in the Basque country. A Spanish Army warehouse was damaged by a bomb after a day of demonstrations throughout the Basque country by supporters of the separatist group ETA to mark the anniversary of the execution of two of its members in 1975. After being pelted with stones by the crowd, police were forced to use tear gas to disperse the nearly 500 demonstrators. [REDACTED]

25X1

Austria: Neo-Nazi Arrested

According to the press, Austrian police have arrested Gottfried Kuessel on charges that he tried to recruit juveniles for rightwing paramilitary groups. He also will be a codefendant in next month's trial in Vienna of West German rightwing radical Ekkehard Weill, who was arrested in Austria in August 1982. [REDACTED]

25X1

29 September 1983**France: Second Direct Action Bombing**

In Paris, Direct Action claimed credit for the early morning bombing of a French military club—the second bombing in three days aimed at the French military. The communique again condemned French military involvement in Lebanon and Chad. [REDACTED]

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30 September 1983

Chile: Bomb Causes Blackout

The entire northern sector of Santiago was blacked out as a result of a bomb explosion under an electrical transformer. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. [REDACTED]

25X1

Costa Rica: Gunmen Attack Residence of UK Ambassador

Four unidentified gunmen in a moving vehicle fired upon the residence of the British Ambassador in San Jose, causing slight damage to the building. No injuries were reported. No group has claimed responsibility, but the Ambassador has accused the Basque terrorist group, ETA, of staging the incident. The Ambassador speculated that the attack might have been motivated by a desire to obtain the release of an ETA member recently arrested in Costa Rica. [REDACTED]

25X1

France: Bombing at Trade Fair

In Marseilles, four extremist groups have claimed credit for a bomb that exploded near the US, Soviet, and Algerian pavillions at the International Trade Fair. Two French rightwing extremist groups—the anti-immigrant Charles Martel Group and the Delta Commandos, an offshoot of the violent Secret Army Organization that fought in the 1960s to keep Algeria French—claimed credit for the attack. A claim by the Armenian Orly Group has been discredited by police. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)—the group behind the attempted assassination of US Charge D'Affaires Christian Chapman in November 1981 and the assassinations of US military attache Lt. Col. Charles R. Ray in January 1982 and Israeli Embassy Second Secretary Yacov Barsimantov in April 1982—also claimed responsibility for the attack. Police are currently focusing their investigation on LARF and the Charles Martel Group. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X6

1 October 1983

Pakistan: Explosion Near Consulate

Three small bombs, one of them placed near the US Consulate, exploded in Peshawar, disrupting seven weeks of calm since the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy began its civil disobedience campaign. No one has claimed responsibility for the bombing, which caused neither injuries nor damage. [REDACTED]

25X1

3 October 1983

West Berlin: Bombing at Journalist's Residence

An early morning explosion at the home of the chief editor of the *Berliner Morgenpost* caused moderate damage but no injuries. The newspaper is published by the Axel Springer Company, which has been targeted by leftwing radicals in the past. No group has claimed responsibility. [REDACTED]

25X1

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4 October 1983**Spain: ETA Claim Slaying Police Officer**


In Bilbao, ETA claimed responsibility for the shooting of a police officer who died two days later. We believe the attack was probably the work of the military faction of ETA, which frequently targets Spanish police. [REDACTED]

25X1

Spain: Kidnaping "Hit List" Revealed

In Madrid, press reports revealed the identities of six prominent businessmen in northern Spain who had been identified by ETA as potential kidnap targets (and one also as an assassination target). The information concerning the kidnap list—obtained by French police wiretaps of Basque terrorists—reportedly was given to the Spanish Government, indicating that Spain and France continue to cooperate to some degree on counterterrorist issues. [REDACTED]

25X1



25X6

6 October 1983**Spain: Bombing of Government Office**

In Irun, two bombs exploded outside a government office that issues national identity cards and passports, causing considerable property damage but no injuries. Although no group claimed credit for the attack, we believe ETA/M was responsible. [REDACTED]

25X1



25X6

Spain: Basque Kidnaping of Spanish Army Captain


In Bilbao, the Political/Military Wing VIII Assembly of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA/PM-VIII) has claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of a Spanish Army Medical Corps captain—the first military officer to be kidnaped by Basque guerrillas. No details of the group's demands have been released. We suspect, however, that the kidnaping might be an attempt to intimidate the court into releasing nine members of this ETA faction who are scheduled to stand trial on charges stemming from a 1980 attack against a military garrison. [REDACTED]

25X1

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Secret

7 October 1983



25X6

South Korea: Investigation Into Taegu Bombing

South Korean officials are increasingly convinced that domestic anti-South Korean Government dissidents, rather than the North Koreans, were responsible for the 22 September 1983 bombing of the US Cultural Center in Taegu. Dissident college students may have intended to embarrass the government during the Inter-Parliamentary Union and American Society Travel Association meetings held in Seoul. [redacted]

25X1

9 October 1983

Burma: South Koreans Killed in Bombing

Some 16 high-ranking South Korean officials and four Burmese were killed in a bombing in Rangoon that probably was intended for visiting South Korean President Chun. Circumstantial evidence points to North Korean involvement, but Burmese insurgents attempting to embarrass the government in Rangoon also could have been responsible. [redacted]

25X1

10 October 1983

Burma: Terrorist Bombings at Rangoon Waterfront

Two bombs exploded prematurely at a ferry slip in Rangoon, injuring only the perpetrator, who was subsequently captured and identified by the Burmese as a Korean. A senior Burmese official speculated—but offered no evidence—that the incident may be connected with the 9 October bombing directed against the visiting South Korean delegation. [redacted]

25X1

11 October 83

Burma: Attempted Arrest of Suspected North Korean Terrorists

An arrest was foiled when one of two suspects threw a handgrenade injuring three policemen. Police returned fire, killing a man later identified as a Korean national. He had in his possession personal effects similar to those of the terrorist apprehended on the Rangoon waterfront on 10 October. The other suspect escaped. [redacted]

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